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History of the First 
NASA Contract 
with Russia 
Barbara D. Connelly-Fratzke 
NASA Headquarters 
Office of Space Systems Development 
This story begins after the end of the cold war with the Soviet Union. after 
perestroika had its initial impact on the economy, at about the time the 
Russian space firms were beginning to lose government support and fac ing 
hard times ahead. 
As part or the FY92 Budget approval, Congress, in its wisdom, directed 
NASA to investigate the Russian space hardware and determine its 
feasibility for use in the U.S. space program. At the invitation of the U.S. 
Embassy in Moscow and the Russian firm NPO Energia, NASA made a 
reconnaissance visit to NPO Energia to open discussions concerning Russian 
space hardware. The trip was successfu l in that NPO Energia opened their 
facility and proudly displayed their space hardware, launch capabilities. 
etc. to NASA. NASA left Russia with a heightened understanding of the 
desperate situation Russian space firms found themselves in with waning 
support from their own government. The firm was desperate enough it 
seemed, to peddle their hardware elsewhere if NASA wasn't a viable 
customer. It was made crystal clear that the firm could only continue. 
anything approaching their current seale of operation, with an influx or 
hard currency from outside Russia. 
The specte r of losing the technology to our economic competi tors in Europe 
and Japan, combined with the possibility that no one would act quickly 
enough and NPO Energia would collapse and its technology be scattered to 
the winds, drove NASA to take unprecedented actions to engage NPO 
Energia in a year long study of its hardware technology for possible 
application to the U.S. space program. 
In the past NASA had participated in cooperati ve agreements, such as the 
Apollo/Soyuz program, where each government supplied its part of the 
effort. The idea of actually out and out purchase or Russian hardware and 
technology was so revolutionary that I refer to it as first hand experience 
with "Russian Roulette," because nothing was as you expected it to be! It 
fit none of the U.S. paradigms for doing business with a foreign en tity. 
The Russian firm was attempting to privatize but its onl y customer was 
still the Russian government. It continued to function as a Government 
Design Bureau but incorporated itself in the State of New York with a U.S. 
subsidiary, and established a two person office in Washington. DC. But the 
firm had little or no hard currency with which to operate. They didn't 
even have sufficient currency for travel to the U.S. to conduct negotiations 
and/or discussions with NASA. 
It all started for me in April 1993. I was recently hired by NASA away 
from DOD and assigned to the Office of Procurement. My experience in 
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international contracting with NATO and the F-16 co-production program 
caused me, in the opinion of the Associate Administrator, to be uniquely 
suited to develop the acquisition strategy for this first Russian 
procurement. This was to be NASA' s first attempt to contract with a 
Russian firm and necessitated the development of a uniquely tailored 
acquisition strategy to contract with the Russians in under 30 days. 
What appeared to be an impossible task was made possible by NASA 
senior management's commitment of top level resources, access to prior 
legal opinions on statutory requirements, and clear direction to simplify 
the process as much as possible. 
The Russian firm, NPO Energia, could well use $1 million in U.S. currency to 
sustain its operations severly impacted by the latest round of upheavals, 
coups, and finally a leadership change in Russia. In return, NASA would 
have access to a full range of space hardware and technology, from the 
Soyuz TM spacecraft, to automated rendezvous and docking systems, test 
facilities, launch vehicles, MIR space station modules, and even an 
electrical test bed for the Buran orbiter/shuttle. 
NPO Energia agreed to support a wide range of special studies and tasking 
during the life of what would have been a one year basic contract. 
NASA developed a simplified contract structure to accommodate this very 
general understanding between a former Communist Design Bureau and 
the United States Government. The use of other forms of agreements was 
considered but discarded based on legal and procurement advice. The 
advice resulted in direction to introduce the Russian firms, attempting to 
privatize and desiring to conduct business in the world market, to the 
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) and the standard practices involved 
in doing business with the United States Government. 
Creation of a simplified acquisition strategy necessitated a bottoms-up 
review of generally applied FAR provisions, rules for waiving and 
deviating from the standard provisions, and the development of unique 
provisions to expressly respond to the unique circumstances of a 
Communist firm newly privatized, but having only a single customer, the 
Russian government. This analysis led us to conclude that NASA could 
waive or deviate almost completely from the FAR. However, a rather more 
conservative position was settled on by NASA's Senior Procurement 
Executive (SPE). When the decision was made to use the FAR, the 
minimum compliment of regulatory provisions that could be applied were 
when the U.S. · dealt with a foreign Government. A decision was made to 
continue to treat NPO Energia as a Government Bureau. 
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The normal provisions, applicable to a foreign government, could then be 
applied to the Russian contract. NASA would require Examination of 
Records by the Comptroller General and the Anti-kickback Provisions to 
reinforce the high standards required in business dealings with the U.S. In 
recognition of the Russian's complete lack of accounting practices, a 
decision was made to waive Cost and Pricing data and all pertinent cost 
provisions as well as all of the environmental and socieo economic 
provisions. 
The fairness and reasonableness of the price, would be establi shed on the 
basis of the lowest price for the same or similar effort in the U.S. This 
form of price analysis would establish the lowest price in the U.S. and an 
upper limit for the negotiations with the Russians. In the absence of 
accounting principles, only a fixed price contract was possible, and as the 
Russian ruble devaluation was running around 10 percent per month , only 
a U.S. currency contract was considered viable. In under a year the ruble 
has devalued over 100 percent. For the year following the contract award 
the ruble devalued a full I 000 percent. 
Advance payments were also considered but discarded as precedent 
setting and a form of monthly payments in 12 equal increments was 
approved by the SPE and the NASA Legal Office. Concrete deliverables in 
the form of studies and tests were to · be specified at the outset, but not 
separately priced due to the complexity of introducing the Russians to 
product based cost estimating, pricing, and payments. The subject of labor 
hour pricing was considered but also wisely discarded as too complex for 
this first contract. 
In opening the discussion with the Russians concerning salaries and labor 
hour rates the Russian's responded, "We sell space hardware not people." 
This set the stage for the remaining negotiations with the Russians. 
The formality of the affair was just the first of many surprises. Our 
negotiation team was referred to as a de legation and treated with all the 
protocol of a U.S. Government or State Department group representing the 
President of the United States. We were met by the General Designer (also 
General Director) of the Russian Space Program. Our "delegation" was led 
by the NASA Assistant Administrator for Russian activities and the 
Associate Administrator (AA) for Space Systems Development (OSSO). This 
degree of protocol was somewhat natural as both sides remembered well 
the relationship and formalities of the Apollo Soyuz test project of twenty 
years earlier. 
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Each side made official welcoming statements. Russian/English 
interpreters were indispensable as there was a complete absence of 
bilingual membership on either side, notwithstanding, the fact that the 
Russian side had many Soyuz engineers experienced with NASA in the 
1970s on the Apollo/Soyuz test project. On the U.S. team the AA for OSSO 
was the single U.S. Apollo/Soyuz member. It was clear from the warm 
greetings that ensued that he was held in high regard by the Russian team. 
This prior association built on friendship, trust, and ultimately success was 
invaluable to NASA in the conduct of these negotiations. 
The first round of negotiations called for separation of the technical and 
contracting teams. The Russians saw the activities as separate and distinct, 
indicating the work agreed to would have little or no relationship to the 
price and other conditions in the contract. 
The model contract presented by NASA required translation into Russian. 
General Provisions, normally incorporated by reference, were included in 
full text and then translated into Russian. Each sentence and each 
paragraph was discussed at length, explained, clarified, and even then the 
Russians proposed changes to all of the General Provisions and the 
Standard Government Data Rights Provisions. 
Each deadlock required the highest member of the U.S. delegation to 
convene a meeting with the Russian General Designer. No member of the 
Russian delegation had the authority to negotiate. The General Designer 
singularly had the final say, but he spoke only to the head of the U.S. 
delegation. His deputy dealt with the AA and the Russian Program 
Manager with the U.S. program manager. Each level exchanged with their 
equivalent/counterpart at every lower level. 
During negotiations no agreement was made on any subject. Positions 
were exchanged and then we moved onto the next issue. At the end of the 
negotiations a contract was developed reflecting NASA's position with no 
confidence that agreement could be reached in total or on any given issue 
with the Russians. 
The eleventh hour of the last day, negotiations were stopped; champagne 
and brandy were served to all to celebrate the Deputy General Designer's 
birthday and speeches were made round the table concerning our mutual 
cooperation and success. 
Negotiations resumed in earnest after the celebration; the objections were 
re-stated; the potential for closure seemed impossible. At this point, when 
all seemed lost, all members of both delegations were called to the General 
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Designer's office. Each lead negotiator described their sticking poinls lo the 
group. All but the top managemenl of both teams were then excused. 
After several minutes of discussion, the General Designer called for his 
negotiating team. When the team returned to the negotiating table, they 
withdrew all exceptions, the contracts were prepared for signalure and a 
signing ceremony was planned. The NASA Administrator had just recently 
communicated his desire to sign the first NASA/Russian contracl, together 
with the head of the Russian Space Agency, Mr. Koptev. This signing 
ceremony was to take place in Washington, DC. This presented a small 
protocol problem in that the General Designer, Mr. Seminov, also wanted to 
sign the contract. 
A compromise was struck after the General Designer was informed that in 
the U.S. only a warranted contracting officer could sign the contract: 
however, in NPO Energia it was he who could decide who would sign for 
NPO Energia. The General Designer elected to sign the contract himself! 
The signing ceremony was moved to a social gathering, apparently 
permitting an exchange between the General Designer and a lower level 
delegation member, the Contracting Officer. Hands were shaken, embraces 
and kisses exchanged, and the contract signed amidst a fanfare of 
photographs noting the ~ aspect of the moment. This final signing 
in Washington D.C. between the two agency heads constituted a top level 
ratification of the signed contract. 
The short suspense of this contract action, made it impossible to reprogram 
funds above $1M; thereby, limiting NASA to a negotiation position under 
$1M or $999,999.00. The Russians hardly understood the subtlety 
involved in the $1.00 reduction. NASA, in the interest of living up to its 
initial overtures of $IM, offered a single $1.00 bill to the General Designer, 
in addition to the contract amount, thereby meeting expectations for a 
million dollar agreement. The first NASA $1.00 is currently on display in 
the space museum at NPO Energia in Kalingrad, Russia. 
This first Russian procurement became the pathfinder and set the standard 
for the Agency for future negotations with the Russians. It was distribuled 
to the NASA Centers, IPL, and several NASA contractors planning 
subcontract activities with the Russians. 
Experiences in doing business with the Russians acquired over the next 
year were shared throughout NASA and among contractor personne! in the 
form of lessons learned. Some of the following lessons learned remain 
peculiar to the Russians and reflect their recent transition to a free market 
economy after generations of Communist Rule: 
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I ) Communication links between locations in the U.S. and Russian 
locations in the Moscow area were nonexistent or of such poor quality as to 
perturb normal program interaction, management and oversight. 
A special telephone and electronic mail link was established with U.S. 
Government Furnished Equipment (GFE) to the contract to resolve this 
problem. Plans for expanded communications links were developed 
throughout the first year of the contract. 
2) Overcoming basic mistrust concerning transfer of information which 
the Russians feared could be used to reverse engineer and thereby acquire 
unique Russian technology was a major problem. 
Training in U.S. contracting and pricing alleviated some of the 
Russian's concern when it was recQgnized that U.S. law would be violated if 
NASA or American contractors attempted to steal Russian technology 
delivered under a U.S. government contract. But, ultimately, personal trust 
between individuals was more important in overcoming this basic 
problem. The Apollo/Soyuz experience was very valuable in that they 
determined that U.S. type documentation simply didn't exist in the Russian 
system. So the Russians' continued reluctance to release some information 
related to the fact that it simply didn't exist. Where necessary, the U.S. 
technical staff created the desired documentation with the help of their 
Russian counterparts. 
3) Training in U.S. cost and pricing techniques, however, did not 
facilitate future negotiations. The Russian financial experts totally ignored 
the rapid devaluation of the ruble but seized on the concept of establishing 
labor estimates by task for future work in developing their cost estimates . 
The Russian concept was to negotiate labor hours required and then 
apply world market rates as a means of developing a fair value for Russian 
work. Cost base contracting will remain impossible in Russia as long as 
there are no accounting systems to collect and allocate costs to the 
products and the ruble continues to fluctuate so radically. Other means for 
developing cost estimates needed to be developed. Several approaches 
were considered: cost estimating relationships, labor hours for the same or 
similar work in the U.S., the use of Russian wages adjusted for inflation, 
and their comparison to other U.S. industry activity in Russia. All of these 
were somewhat successful and they tended to converge on approximately 
the same cost range for a given set of tasks. 
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4) Translation of reports and existing documentation remains a major 
effort under a Russian contract. The resources applied to this problem are 
in direc t competition with resources required for the technical assessment 
products of the contract which are of principal interest. 
Translation software tools were evaluated at length . The best 
products on the market were supplied to NPO Energia. Human translators 
found them to be insufficient for the task at hand. Most were designed for 
business or legal purposes and not for space translation technology 
purposes. Recognizing a serious need, several firms in Russia began the 
development of space technology software called "Stylus for Space." 
Together with a Small Disadvantage Business (8A) firm in the U.S., they are 
marketing this software around the world. NASA's and the Russian firm' s 
evaluation of the software indicates it is the best Russian to American. 
American to Russian translation system on the market. The rumor is the 
software was developed originally by the Soviet KGB. (It makes you 
wonder what the CIA might have that would further facilitate U.S./Russian 
joint activities). 
5) Availability of hard currency. which is defined as anything but the 
ruble, became a significant issue. 
The first program review in the U.S. was almost canceled due to a 
lack of hard currency. Airlines in Russia were no longer accepting rubles 
as payment for plane tickets.· Payments under our first Russian contract 
didn't flow smoothly, initially. This was because invoices were not 
prepared properly or submitted in a timely manner, and later because the 
banks involved in transferring money to Russia were inexperienced. In 
addition, the Russian banks denied receipt of the funds, without evidence 
from the forwarding bank, which included serial numbers, dates, times, 
amounts, etc. 
Special advance travel payments were required to overcome thi s 
problem. Tickets were prepaid by NASA; per diem was transferred to a 
U.S. bank; even temporary loans were made by the NASA Credi t Union to 
support the Russians while they attended their first program review in 1he 
U.S. 
During the year NASA also learned that the Russian bank also taxed 
the payments to NPO Energia, limiting the hard currency transferred to the 
company to 20 percent of the total payment. The total payment was 
adjusted in the following manner. 
a) 40 percent was converted at an unfavorable ruble rate, 
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b) 40 percent was converted at a favorable ruble rate (at least 
favorable for that day) and, 
c) 20 percent was paid in hard currency to the Russian firm. 
Recognizing the Russian firm's need for the hard currency as a 
critical element of all future negotiations included reimbursement for 
travel, shipments, and work in the U.S. This was critical to the success of 
the first Russian contract and will continue to be critical to all future 
contracts as long as the ruble fluctuation and Russian inflation is out of 
control. 
6) Rights to Data remains a problem in the first Russian contract. The 
contract provides that all data first produced under the contract shall be 
provided to the U.S. government with unlimited rights. This is standard 
under U.S. Contracts. 
Unfortunately, to date, everything that has been delivered under the 
contract, except for a study plan, has been marked "Proprietary" indicating 
the Russians' continuing concern that their space technology will be stolen 
from them unless carefully protected. 
There were also lessons learned by the Russians after a year of negotiating 
and working with NASA and NASA's contractors. These lesson.s were 
freely discussed with me and represent a highly enlightened Russian 
negotiator: 
I) Even in the first negotiations, NPO Energia understood the nature of 
fixed price contracting. Perhaps their only experience is this simple form 
of contract which defines what NPO Energia would do for a given price. 
Examples included: Soyuz trips to MIR space station by Japan, France and 
Germany. There were agreements/contracts under the Communist system 
also. It's clear that the vendors involved with NPO Energia made 
commitments and delivered high quality products on schedule. The 
resources, however, that were applied by the vendor were normally 
unknown by NPO Energia and probably came directly from the Soviet 
government not through NPO Energia. 
2) During the first round of negotiations the Russians challenged the use 
of U.S. law. Why shouldn't we use Russian law, or even the law of a third 
impartial nation? 
NASA pointed out that all the contract provisions had precedence in 
U.S. law not in Russian law. Therefore, any future disagreements would 
require consistent interpretations to resolve. NPO Energia then sugg~_ted 
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we apply independent arbitration under Geneva, Switzerland laws. In 
these first contract negotiations, NPO Energia conceded to U.S. law. 
However, in later negotiations with NASA contractors. NPO Energia has 
insisted on arbitration under Geneva, Switzerland Jaw. 
3) At each negotiation throughout the year, the Russians refused to 
accept the Examination of Records by Comptroller General clause. 
Because Congressional approval is required to deviate from thi s 
provision, NASA has argued successfully to retain the clause and to date 
the clause has been included in NASA prime contracts and subcontracts 
with Russia. As the Russian Government controls VISAs into the country. 
the comptroller general could only examine records at the invitation or the 
Russian Government. 
4) Achieving a fair and reasonable price for work in Russia remains a 
major challenge. NASA started by scoping the value or the work , 
considering a myriad of factors. This was essential as the Russian's 
estimate of the value of contract work exceeded NASA's on the order or a 
factor of ten. To encourage the Russians to develop proposals based on 
unrealistic estimates would have been counterproducti ve to both parties. 
But in short order, the Russian's lesson learned was to negotiate other 
elements of the agreement: 
Advance Payments or milestone payments (front loaded) for 
supplies, services, data and transportation remain critical to the Russians. 
The Russians have no methodology for scoping the work. no estimating 
capabilities, and no historical data, so achie"'ing agreement required 
application of flexible alternatives to trading price offers. Ad1.rance 
payments or milestone payments are one o.f 1he- key alternatives. Another 
alternative is descoping or revising the y,'OJ'k required to reach agreement. 
Yet, another alternative is assuring work in 1he U.S. and reimbursement of 
travel for the Russian program office personnel. (The opponunity to visit 
the U.S. may be a fringe benefit for the Russian employees.) 
In later negotiations the Russians sought salary payments while in 
the U.S. These U.S. salaries were imperative for the Russians to obtain 
hard currency while in the U.S. The firm paid hotel bills and covered food. 
but the Russian employees were virtually penniless during their time in 
the U.S. The Russians successfully negotiated salaries of $7.00 to $10.00 an 
hour with a bonus of an additional $4.00 to $6.00 for English proficiency. 
The lesson learned by the Russians is that there are elements other than 
price that can be negotiated and that have fi nancial benefit to the company 
and to the employee. 
For the early discussions of a joint space station this issue of pricing 
Russian effort loomed as a show stopper. The Russians sought to use U.S. 
techniques for cost estimating to determine the value of their supplies and 
services. NASA continued with the initial approach of scoping the work for 
the Russians and providing them with the U.S. Government estimate of 
value in Russia to help focus their efforts and expectations. In the joint 
space station discussions we again fell into the trap of separating the 
technical and business negotiating groups. The results were predictable. 
The technical team developed, independent of cost, an extremely robust 
Russian contribution to the joint station. The Russian financial groups are 
assuming that the more the Russians contribute, the higher the U.S. 
contribution to Russia would be. So a lesson NPO Energia should have 
learned, perhaps the most important lesson of all, has not yet been 
learned. The U.S. contribution is a very political issue because it diverts 
U.S. assets away from U.S. companies offshore to Russia. This diversion of 
U.S. assets to the Russians is further exacerbated by the downsizing of the 
U.S. budget. The future of the joint space station may succeed or fail on 
this single issue. 
In conclusion, many of the lessons learned need to be unlearned. Use of a 
contract to engage a non-market business makes no since at all. Nothing 
about the agreement between these parties fits a market economy's idea of 
a contract and certainly not a U.S. Government contract. In hindsight, use 
of the agreements authority vested in the organization under the .Space Act 
or under the Grants and Cooperative agreements authority would have 
been more appropriate. Only recently has an interpretation of the latter of 
these agreements authority been expanded to permit payment of 
appropriated funds. 
Had this interpretation existed at the time the first contract was signed in 
Russia, there would have been no "First Russian Contract." The agreements 
authority provides the flexibility necessary to reflect the unique 
relationship necessary to conduct business under the circumstances 
existing in Russia today and for sometime in the future. 
Too much time and energy was wasted on U.S. regulations and statutes 
designed for U.S. industry based on historical precedence which had no 
relevance in Russia. The value for money invested in this first contract 
was ten fold but the effort wasted on U.S. contracting rules and regulations, 
if avoided might have resulted in 100 fold return which would have 
clearly been a "Win Win" situation for both parties. 
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